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Judge Neil Gorsuch shakes hands with President Donald Trump after he was nominated for the 
Supreme Court on Jan. 31. His nomination has sparked a political battle that largely ignores that 
a judge’s duty is to simply interpret the law. Nicholas Kamm /AFP /Getty Images  
In our fractured times, the idea of a judge acting as an umpire — and not as a partisan — is 
rejected by many on both sides of the political fence. And the nomination of Neil Gorsuch to the 
U.S. Supreme Court seat that was occupied by Antonin Scalia serves as proof. 
The president’s constitutional power to nominate “judges of the Supreme Court,” and the 
Senate’s power to give its “advice and consent” to such nominations are intensely political acts. 
President Donald Trump fulfilled a campaign promise by nominating to the court one of the 
judges on a list published before his election. The Senate now has its turn. Pending disclosure of 
some information, the Republican-majority Senate will likely confirm the nominee. 
The political battle to confirm Gorsuch will have some long-term adverse effects on one — and 
possibly both — of the political parties; which party suffers most by its actions in the next 
several months is impossible to predict. 
The Constitution requires all “judicial officers” to swear or affirm “to support this Constitution.” 
The duty to support the Constitution has come to mean upholding the rule of law. The rule of law 
is based on the idea that our government is one of laws, of reason rather than arbitrary action. 
The responsibility to uphold the law, as Chief Justice John Roberts stated in his nomination 
hearing, means a judge’s duty is “to call balls and strikes,” to serve, in this metaphor, as an 
umpire, not as a player or partisan. 
This is what makes judges different from politicians: Judges are duty-bound to follow the rule of 
law, even when that duty may be contrary to the judge’s political views. 
No such duty exists for politicians, including senators. They are permitted to vote “yes” or “no” 
for any or even no reason. There is one catch: Senators look more senatorial if they can arguably 
claim their vote is not solely political but made in the greater interest of the country. 
To limit the options of senators of the opposing party, presidents of both parties for at least 25 
years have made nominations to the court using the same template: They have emphasized the 
nominee’s acceptance of this duty to the rule of law, largely by highlighting the nominee’s 
educational background and judicial experience. 
This template was used in the selection of Gorsuch as Trump’s first nominee. Gorsuch has an 
impeccable educational background. He received his bachelor’s and law degrees from Ivy 
League schools (Columbia and Harvard), and earned a doctor of philosophy degree from Oxford 
University. His experience includes service as a law clerk, including as a Supreme Court clerk; 
as a lawyer in private practice and in the Department of Justice; and, for the past decade, as a 
federal appeals court judge. 
Gorsuch’s last job had been a requirement for nomination, with Justice Elena Kagan, a former 
U.S. solicitor general, breaking the pattern. Since 1975, every nominee had judicial experience 
when nominated to the high court. Before Kagan, the last justice to lack federal judicial 
experience when nominated was Sandra Day O’Connor, who was a state appellate court judge 
when she was nominated in 1981. 
This was historically not the case. Earl Warren was nominated to the Supreme Court by 
President Dwight Eisenhower in 1953 after serving as a district attorney, California attorney 
general and governor of California. The last justices to move from the practice of law to the high 
court were Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist, both of whom were confirmed in 1971. 
The criterion of federal judicial experience has become an apparent necessity solely for political 
reasons. Though federal court of appeals judges often must interpret federal statutes, which state 
appeals court judges rarely do, this difference is legally irrelevant. How a judge interprets 
statutes will remain the same, no matter which lawmakers adopted the statute. 
The political necessity of federal appeals court experience is that it allows the president to argue 
that the judge is in the judicial mainstream and not a threat to the freedoms enjoyed by ordinary 
Americans. 
Most Americans know little about how judges make and justify legal decisions, and on most 
issues there’s little reason why they should take the time to learn. Unfortunately, when hot-
button political controversies become legal disputes, those on both sides who care about such 
issues want to know whether the judge will support their political view. This desire, of course, is 
one a judge committed to upholding the rule of law cannot fulfill. 
No judge seeking to uphold the rule of law would commit himself in advance to a particular 
vote; that would be pre-judging a case — prejudice of the worst kind. 
But convincing a politically divided nation that a judge will embrace his role as an umpire rather 
than a political actor seems an impossible task. 
The template used to mainstream the nominee is thus designed to limit the options of the 
opposition party (in this case, the Democratic Party). The Republican argument is that Gorsuch 
may be politically conservative (he is), but as a judge he will simply interpret the law (and the 
Constitution) as an umpire. Therefore, if Democrats oppose this nominee, they are engaged in a 
political witch hunt. 
For Democratic senators, the Republican decision to refuse to give a hearing in 2016 to Merrick 
Garland, President Barack Obama’s nominee to the seat opened after Scalia’s death, may lead to 
an effort to stall the Gorsuch nomination. 
The Senate currently has a rule that bars a vote on any nominee to the Supreme Court unless 60 
senators agree otherwise. Republicans have 52 seats. This rule may be abolished by a majority 
vote. 
How both parties navigate the continuing existence of this filibuster rule will have cascading 
effects. Republicans could win the battle (confirm Gorsuch) but lose the war (attempting to 
confirm another nominee to the court who would alter its balance). Democrats could lose both 
the battle and the war. 
Both parties are already assessing how their approach will affect their chances in the 2018 and 
2020 elections. The fracturing of America is likely to continue — indeed, to accelerate. 
Michael S. Ariens is a professor at the St. Mary’s University School of Law and an expert in 
constitutional law. 
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